“Islam and the End of Secularism.”

John O. Voll
Georgetown University

Presentation to the Philadelphia Society

(Edited Transcript)

 April 22, 2001.

            It’s a real pleasure to be here. The title of the session indicates that we will be talking about “The Ethnic and Religious Factors,” with the subtitle of “Conflict or Conciliation.” In the introduction, our chair, Michael Franz, spoke of religion as a problem, and I feel that I may be somewhat of a “sheep in wolf’s clothing,” since I will be suggesting that religion might involve a vehicle for conciliation as well as for conflict. I want to speak of religion as a solution, not as a problem.

            My basic framework can be stated simply. I would like to define that framework with the words of a prominent sociologist of religion, Rodney Stark, in the journal Sociology of Religion about a year and a half ago. Stark wrote in an article entitled “Secularization R.I.P.:”

“For nearly three centuries, social scientists and assorted Western intellectuals have been promising the end of religion…. Modernization is seen as the causal engine dragging the gods into retirement…” A few pages later, he concludes: “Let us declare an end to social scientific faith in the theory of secularization, recognizing that it was the product of wishful thinking. After nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophecies, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories.”[1]

            I think that we are looking at a world that negates the idea that modernization necessarily involves the end of religion. We are at the end of an era. As we look at the role of the United States in world affairs, the end of secularization as an accepted dimension of modernization rather than as a competing ideology must be recognized. We need, as believers, or we need as Americans, or we need as “deformed Protestants,”[2] or as reformed Catholics, or as a Methodist preacher’s son teaching in a Jesuit institution (which I am) – we need to re-recognize religion.

            Briefly stated, there are three elements in this framework. I will state these and then look at the implications for relations of the United States with the Muslim world.             The experience of the societies in the world in the past half-century shows that modernization does not mean the end of religion as a major force in public life. That is, the secularization of society is not an inherent part of the process of modernization. Secondly, it is clear that policies of separation of church and state or religion and politics are not religiously neutral. That is, advocacy of secularization and secularism represents an ideological, religious position. It is not an objective, value-free description of what happens in modernization. And thirdly, this means, in policy terms, that secularization is not something that just happens as a natural part of the historical process of modernization, but rather, secularism can be recognized for what I think it has always been: one of a number of competing visions of what society should be in the contemporary era. That is, we are at the end of the period when secularization has been taken as a given in the development of modern societies. We are at the end of secularization.

            This situation is an important dimension of what has sometimes been spoken of as the resurgence of religion – and religions – at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Again, what we are looking at, and what we need to see, is that the idea of secularization of society, and the accompanying idea that this secularization is a good thing, is a part of a world of competing visions rather than just simply a social science description of so-called reality.

            This new perspective is especially important for understanding contemporary Islam. In the Muslim world, advocacy of secularization has always been more clearly recognized as a competing ideology than as a necessary and inherent part of modernization.

            For two centuries, the major efforts for reform in the Muslim world have aimed at creating modern nations, modern states, and modern nation-states. In keeping with the earlier idea that modernization somehow involved separating religion from public life, most of the modernizing reformers were identified with secularization. The key elements in most modernization reform programs of the 19^th and 20^th centuries involved creating a clear break with the past, which was viewed and defined as “traditional.” The major social science studies that came out in the 1950s and in the 1960s defining  modernization made this clear. One of the major studies of modernization that played a significant role in shaping the understanding of the processes involved was a book published in the 1950s called The Passing of Traditional Society by Daniel Lerner. This set a clear vision of what modernization was believed to involve. In this discussion, Lerner spoke of people that he called “the Transitionals.” In this perspective there were “traditional” people who still believed, among other things, that religion was very important. In addition, you had the people created by modernization processes, the “moderns.” The “modern” people believed, among other things, that religion had no role in the public sphere and that it was a matter for personal and individual life. In a description of “Transitionals” in Turkey, Lerner said that they “are acquiring psychic mobility, a personal capacity to identify widely and empathize readily. They are secularizing… They are becoming activist. In their view, problems are to be dealt with by policy rather than by prayer."[3]

            That was the picture of what a modernizing person was supposed to be. However,  as we reach the end of the era when secularization was assumed to be an inherent part of modernization, we recognize that many of the “modern” people in fully modernized societies at the beginning of the 21^st century do not necessarily see policy as an alternative to prayer. In contemporary Turkey, almost half a century after Lerner’s study, there are many thoroughly modern business men, scientists, and intellectuals who do not feel that they must choose between policy or prayer but, instead, have a perspective that involves policy and prayer.

The major modernizers in the Muslim world have usually been seen through the secular perspectives of old-style secularization theory. As Americans look at the Muslim world, they see the secularizing “modernizers” as heroic figures. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey is a major example. Kemal created the foundations for the modern society of Turkey that is one of our great allies. Turkey has been an important part of NATO and was a key supporter of the West in the Cold War. Kemal’s achievements are widely and justifiably recognized as being essential for the creation of contemporary Turkey.

            In the context of the question of religion in international affairs and in the processes of creating modern societies, it is important to recognize that Kemal created a political system that was based on the assumption that it is necessary to take religion out of public life if you are going to have a modern society. Reza Shah Pahlevi in the 1920s in Iran and his son Muhammad Shah in the 1950s and the 1960s operated within a similar policy framework.  There are many other cases in the Muslim world where secularization was viewed as a necessary part of modernization. This is visible in descriptions of processes of social modernization as well as in politics. Frequently, the rejection of the veil is seen as an important element in modernization programs, and is often mentioned in descriptions of reformist programs. In Egypt, the signal “that a new era for women was beginning”[4] was when Huda Sha’rawi and Nabawiyya Musa dramatically and publically removed their veils on their return from an international meeting, as they stepped off the train in the great railroad station in Ramses Square in Cairo in 1923.

            What we need to recognize now is that the idea that one must separate religion from public life in order to be modern is refuted by the lives and work of many people, including, I am sure, many in this room. It is refuted as well by the experience of many countries and individuals in the Muslim world.

As we look at the Muslim world in the context of options for American policy, it is important to keep in mind this broader framework of the end of secularization theory. It is important because we need to look for the right allies. In an era that recognizes the importance of civilizational dialogue, we need to be aware of those people with whom we can work and talk most effectively. John Lenczowski concluded his presentation yesterday with the strong affirmation that liberty requires a moral foundation and we might expand that important affirmation to note that liberty around the world requires moral foundations. If we are seeking to build and strengthen the moral foundations for liberty in the United States, we do not necessarily go to an agnostic, near-atheist novelist to seek out our allies. And so, if we don’t do that in the United States, why should we do it when we deal with the Muslim world? Why should we see Salman Rushdie, for example, as a great Islamic moderate and ally, as opposed to looking for those people, and talking with those people, who are strong believers in and upholders of religiously-based moral values, people who believe that religion does have a place in public policy. In this context, the Ayatullah Khumayni, to put it as an extreme case, would have been a better ally for us than Salman Rushdie. However, our only options are not having to choose between the Rushdies and the Khumaynis. We do have in the Islamic world, many people who have a sense of a morally-based community, with whom we can and with whom many people do talk. I would call your attention to a group that Anthony Sullivan and I are a part of, called the “Halaqa.” This is an effort, on a small scale, to provide vehicles for effective communication based on shared awareness of moral community. It involves both Western and Muslim intellectuals, including people like Fahmi Huweidi (Egypt) and Rachid al-Ghannoushi (Tunisia).[5] There are many other people in the Muslim world, some more visible than others, who represent significant examples of the importance of religion in the public sphere in contexts of modernity. There are leaders like Anwar Ibrahim, who combine religious commitment with public policy leadership roles. Although Anwar Ibrahim is currently in jail in Malaysia because of domestic political conflicts, he and many like him represent a living refutation of the old secularization theory.

            In the era of the end of secularization as a given, and in an era when we have to recognize secularism as one of the competing set of ideologies defining the vision of what we want society to be, we can and must choose effective allies. We do not have to deal only with agnostic secularists when we go to the Muslim world. In our contemporary world, there is a clash; yes, there are conflicts. However, the conflict is not the clash as defined by Samuel Huntington as a “clash of civilizations,” especially a conflict between Islam and the West in a “global war” between Muslims and non-Muslims.[6] One important clash, rather, is between those who think that religion doesn’t have a role in society and those who believe that religion does have a role. In that clash, people who believe that liberty must be defended by having a strong religiously-based moral foundation have many natural allies in the Islamic world.

            Thank you very much.